Pakistan’s New Army Rocket Force Command: A Shift in Conventional Deterrence
Following the four-day military conflict with India in May, Pakistan announced the creation of a new Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC). While some observers dismiss the move as a hurried reaction to the recent tensions, and others see it as a sign of potential escalation, both interpretations miss the deeper reality. Background discussions with senior officials suggest that ARFC is not an overnight development it is the culmination of decades of evolution in Pakistan’s conventional military doctrine.
The Logic Behind ARFC
For years, Pakistan has struggled with a strategic dilemma: how to balance India’s overwhelming conventional military superiority without becoming overly dependent on nuclear weapons. The solution, gradually refined by military planners and scientists, has been to develop credible long-range conventional strike capabilities. The establishment of ARFC is the institutional manifestation of this approach.
Previously, artillery divisions equipped with long-range rocket and missile systems were dispersed across different formations, operating in relative isolation. ARFC brings these assets under a unified command structure, enhancing synergy, efficiency, and doctrinal clarity. It is less about new weaponry and more about using existing capabilities in a smarter, more integrated way.
The Fateh-Series at the Core
At the heart of ARFC lies the Fateh-series rockets—indigenously developed systems with improved range and precision. These rockets symbolize a new phase in Pakistan’s conventional deterrence posture. Their utility goes beyond raw firepower: they provide flexibility, control, and credible strike options below the nuclear threshold.
In future conflicts, these systems would enable Pakistan to conduct short, sharp, and intense firepower duels, imposing costs on an adversary without escalating to all-out war.
Timing and Strategic Significance
The unveiling of ARFC comes at a time when India continues to expand its conventional edge, modernizing its armed forces and investing heavily in missile defense systems. Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s move serves both operational and psychological purposes.
By institutionalizing ARFC, Islamabad sends a clear message: it retains the ability to circumvent India’s missile defense shield and hold high-value targets deep inside Indian territory at risk. This alters deterrence dynamics by complicating Indian military calculations.
Shaping Deterrence Beyond Nuclear Weapons
Deterrence in South Asia has often been framed exclusively around nuclear weapons. Yet, as analysts note, deterrence also operates in the conventional spectrum. ARFC serves as an “operational leveler,” diluting conventional asymmetry and denying India the luxury of assuming escalation control.
If India were to underestimate Pakistan’s conventional options, it might feel tempted to push the envelope. ARFC raises those costs, closing the window for miscalculation. In this way, Pakistan strengthens deterrence by punishment—the ability to inflict rapid and decisive costs on an aggressor.
Addressing the Skeptics
Critics may argue that ARFC blurs the line between conventional and nuclear deterrence. However, its very design suggests otherwise. The systems under ARFC are conventional and indigenous, separate from Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Their purpose is to provide credible non-nuclear alternatives and reduce reliance on nuclear escalation in crises.
Of course, India may respond by accelerating counterforce capabilities or deepening its reliance on missile defenses. Such spirals are not new to South Asia. Yet compared to the alternative—depending solely on nuclear weapons to offset conventional weakness—ARFC represents a measured, rational, and even responsible approach.
Conclusion
The creation of the Army Rocket Force Command marks a significant doctrinal evolution for Pakistan. It ensures that any conflict, if imposed, will remain short, sharp, and prohibitively costly for the aggressor.
This is not escalation for escalation’s sake. It is deterrence in its purest form—deterring war by raising the price of miscalculation. In a region where two nuclear states face off, peace is preserved not by optimism alone, but by ensuring both sides fully understand the consequences of aggression.